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Abstract: This paper aims to defend the use of the notion of experimental individuation, 
which has recently been developed by Ruey-Lin Chen, as a criterion for the reality of 
theoretical entities. In short, when scientists experimentally individuate an entity, a realist 
conclusion about that entity is warranted. We embed this claim regarding experimental 
individuation within a framework that allows for other criteria of reality. And we 
understand so-called retail arguments regarding the reality of a particular theoretical 
entity as arguments that concern choosing an appropriate criterion of reality for that entity 
and determining whether the relevant first-order scientific evidence satisfies that 
criterion. We argue that such retail arguments are philosophical because defending 
criteria of reality, and showing that they are or are not satisfied in particular cases, 
involves work that is distinctively philosophical. And we illustrate this philosophical 
work by applying our criterion of experimental individuation to three historical cases: 
Davy’s potassium, Lavoisier’s muriatic radical, and Thomson’s electrified particles. 
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1. Introduction 
The goal of this paper is to introduce experimental individuation as a relatively theory-
independent criterion for granting the reality of theoretical entities. The notion of 
experimental individuation has been developed by Chen (2016, 2018), who has focused 
on the issue of individuality rather than that of reality. We propose to use Chen’s notion 
as a criterion of reality. We argue that demonstrating the experimental individuation of an 
entity constitutes a good reason to be a realist about that entity. Conversely, if scientists 
cast doubt on the prospects of experimentally individuating an entity, that doubt 
sometimes constitutes a good reason to be an anti-realist about that entity. 
 When we put forward experimental individuation as a criterion of reality, we 
don’t hold that it is the only criterion of reality, and we don’t attempt to generalize it to all 
of the entities posited by our best theories. Rather, we admit that it has limited 
applicability and that there are other valid experimental and theoretical criteria of reality. 
 As a consequence, applying the criterion of experimental individuation to a 
particular entity in a particular case requires a retailist approach to the scientific realism 
debate. We take the term ‘retailist’ from Park (2016), and use it to denote those 
approaches to the realism debate that focus on the truth of particular theoretical claims 
and the reality of particular entities rather than theories and entities in general. This sort 
of approach was originally proposed by Magnus and Callender (2004), who argue that we 
ought to abandon “wholesale arguments,” which are “arguments about all or most of the 
entities posited in our best scientific theories,” and embrace “retail arguments,” which are 
“arguments about specific kinds of things such as neutrinos, for instance” (2004, p. 321).  
 In our paper, we understand the contrast between retailism and wholesalism in the 
following way. Retailists do not attempt to generalize their conclusions based on the 
investigation of one case to other similar cases, while wholesalists do. Each scientific 
case, whether similar to a previously examined one or not, must be investigated 
individually by analyzing the details of the scientific practices involved. To put the point 
another way, wholesalists generalize a single criterion of reality to all of the entities 
posited by our best theories. In contrast, retailists hold that we should not generalize any 
criterion of reality that is successfully applied to one particular case to all cases—
different cases may require different criteria.  
 We take the retailist approach to the realism debate to be promising because it fits 
well with many cases in the history of science. By arguing, within a retailist framework, 
that experimental individuation serves as a relatively theory-independent criterion of 
reality, we aim to promote the retailist approach. We argue that articulating and defending 
such a criterion, and determining whether it is satisfied, involves distinctively 
philosophical work that goes beyond the first-order scientific evidence. And we 
distinguish between what we call scientific retail arguments, which do not go beyond the 
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first-order evidence, and philosophical retail arguments, which involve determining 
whether or not the first-order evidence satisfies some criterion of reality.  
 To that end, we proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces our retailist approach, 
develops the notion of a philosophical retail argument, and distinguishes that notion from 
the notion of a scientific retail argument. Section 3 puts forward experimental 
individuation as a criterion for the reality of theoretical entities. In section 4, we apply 
this criterion to three historical case studies: the discovery of potassium, the elimination 
of the muriatic radical, and the measurement of the electron’s mass-to-charge ratio. In the 
course of discussing these case studies, we develop three philosophical retail arguments 
regarding the reality of these three entities. We do so in order to defend our claim that 
experimental individuation can serve as a criterion of reality and show that applying it 
involves distinctively philosophical work. Section 5 provides some further defense of our 
criterion by arguing that its relative theory-independence makes it preferable to more 
theory-dependent criteria. In section 6, we conclude. 
2. Philosophical Retail Arguments 
Our claim that experimental individuation can serve as a criterion of reality is situated 
within a retailist framework that allows for other criteria of reality. In this section, we 
first introduce retailism and then develop the notion of a philosophical retail argument. 
  
 In order to grasp what retailism is, it’s useful to begin with the position to which it 
is opposed, namely, wholesalism. Wholesalism comes in a number of varieties. One is 
standard scientific realism (e.g., Putnam 1978; Boyd 1981), which is a position regarding 
theories in general. The basic idea is that the success of our best theories warrants the 
claim that they are at least approximately true, as well as the claim that the theoretical 
entities that they posit exist. Some forms of anti-realism (e.g., van Fraassen 1980) are 
also wholesalist positions, insofar as they typically involve endorsing claims about 
theories in general and denying that success warrants the two claims endorsed by 
proponents of standard scientific realism. 
 These positions are wholesalist because, as Magnus and Callender (2004) argue, 
their proponents attempt to support them by engaging in wholesale arguments. Magnus 
and Callender focus on two examples of such arguments. First of all, there is the no-
miracles argument (NMA), according to which the success of our best theories would be 
a miracle if those theories weren’t at least approximately true. Second, there is the 
pessimistic meta-induction (PMI), which uses past successful-but-false theories as an 
inductive basis for concluding that our current successful theories are false as well. NMA 
is taken to support “[w]holesale realism,” which “seeks to explain the success of science 
in general”; and PMI is taken to support “wholesale anti-realism,” which “seeks to 
explain the history of science in general” (2004, p. 321). 
!3
 Magnus and Callender propose that we ought to replace wholesale arguments 
with retail arguments, and wholesalism with retailism. Unlike wholesale arguments, the 
scope of a retail argument is restricted to a particular theory or a particular kind of 
theoretical entity. By shifting the focus from theories in general to theories in particular, 
philosophers can dissolve the traditional realism debate and abandon wholesalism for 
retailism. Retailism, as Magnus and Callender understand it, amounts to the position that 
“realism and anti-realism are options to be exercised sometimes here and sometimes 
there” (2004, p. 337), which opens up the possibility that “[t]here may be good reasons to 
be a realist about neutrinos, an anti-realist about top quarks, and so on” (2004, p. 333). 
 A number of philosophers have defended positions similar to Magnus and 
Callender’s retailism. For example, Saatsi adopts the retail-wholesale metaphor, and 
attempts to determine whether particular realist arguments are “more form-driven 
(wholesale) or more content-driven (retail)” (2010, pp. 10-11). Form-driven arguments 
“attempt[] to justify some inductive inferences by reference to some general formal 
attribute unifying all these inferences,” while content-driven arguments “take there to be 
more justificatory analysis to be done on [a] case-by-case basis by taking into account 
what these inferences are about” (2010, p. 11). Saatsi goes on to argue that content-driven 
arguments are preferable to form-driven ones. While his distinction is, strictly speaking, 
different from Magnus and Callender’s, the obvious similarities between the two 
distinctions are presumably what lead Saatsi to employ their terminology. To take another 
example, Fitzpatrick defends what he calls the “local strategy,” according to which “the 
best foundation for a realist attitude towards a particular theoretical claim of modern 
science … is the weight of the particular first-order evidence that led scientists to accept 
the claim in the first place” (2013, p. 143). Fitzpatrick acknowledges that his “thesis is 
similar to that of Magnus and Callender,” and states that he “agree[s] with this move 
towards retail arguments” (2013, p. 142). 
 As we stated in section 1, we propose another way to contrast retailism and 
wholesalism, namely, in terms of criteria of reality. In order to conclude that a particular 
component of a theory (for example an entity or a structure) exists, retailism allows for 
the use of distinct criteria of reality in different cases and contexts while wholesalism 
requires the use of only one criterion. To put the point another way, wholesalists adopt a 
single criterion while retailists allow for one or more criteria of reality. In our view, the 
main insight of Magnus and Callender, Saatsi, and Fitzpatrick is that the details matter 
when determining what components of our theories we ought to commit to. However, if 
the details matter only to the extent that those details do or do not satisfy a single 
criterion of reality, then it seems that we have a wholesale argument instead of a retail 
argument. We take it that the details also matter for determining which of several distinct 
criteria of reality are appropriate and applicable to a given case, which is why we 
understand the contrast between retailism and wholesalism in the way we have proposed.  
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 Understood in this way, the contrast between retailism and wholesalism concerns 
argumentative strategy as opposed to the theoretical content to which retailists and 
wholesalists commit.  When it comes to a particular theory, a retailist and a wholesalist 1
may indeed commit to some of the same content. But the wholesalist will generalize the 
criterion of reality applied to the content to all cases, while the retailist will not generalize 
the applied criterion to other cases—in each individual case the retailist should search for 
an appropriate criterion. 
 This brings us to the central element in the retailist’s argumentative strategy, 
namely, the retail argument. One issue regarding retail arguments is whether they go 
beyond science into philosophy.  Magnus and Callender give no indication that retail 2
arguments go beyond the first-order scientific evidence. According to them, we should 
“answer the question, ‘Are there atoms?’, by referring to the same evidence scientists use 
to support the atomic hypothesis” (2004, p. 321). And while Saatsi argues that “content-
driven realist arguments are bona fide philosophical arguments” (2010, p. 26), arguments 
can be more or less content-driven, and he admits that “[f]ully content-driven” arguments 
are “[s]cientific arguments” (2010, p. 11).  
 According to our way of understanding it, retailism does go beyond science into 
philosophy. The first-order scientific evidence that scientists present must satisfy some 
kind of criterion or other in order to warrant a realist attitude towards a particular 
theoretical claim, entity, structure, etc. Our focus in this paper is on entities. While 
scientists often argue that a particular kind of entity exists, their arguments detail the first-
order evidence for the existence of that kind of entity without invoking a criterion of 
reality that this evidence satisfies. Because scientists are silent on this matter, it takes 
some philosophical work to articulate criteria of reality, determine which criteria are 
appropriate and applicable to a particular case, and assess whether or not the first-order 
evidence satisfies a particular criterion once it is deemed applicable. Upon doing so, it’s 
possible for philosophers to conclude that the evidence does not satisfy the most 
appropriate criterion, and to disagree with a scientist’s judgment that some evidence 
supports the claim that a particular kind of entity exists. The fact that retailists can 
disagree with scientists’ judgments shows that retailism does not amount to merely 
repeating evidence first put forward by scientists—it involves going beyond science into 
philosophy. 
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this important distinction. It’s worth noting that so-1
called selective realist positions differ from one other and from other positions in the realism debate, not in 
terms of the argumentative strategy they adopt but in terms of the theoretical content to which they are 
committed. For example, entity realists commit to the reality of entities, structural realists to structures, and 
deployment realists to theoretical components that contribute to generating novel predictive successes.
 Dicken (2013) raises an important challenge to retailism on this basis. Responding to this challenge falls 2
outside of the scope of the present paper.
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 In sum, our understanding of retailism allows us to maintain that the first-order 
evidence is crucially important. It also allows us to admit that issues in the realism debate 
are not settled by first-order evidence alone—they also require distinctively philosophical 
argumentation. And it provides us a way to go beyond that evidence in terms of criteria of 
reality that are philosophical, at least in the sense that such criteria have traditionally 
played a role within the realism debate. Identifying and defending criteria of reality, and 
showing that the evidence does or does not satisfy them, involves work that is 
distinctively philosophical. 
 We illustrate these ideas in terms of a case from the history of science. This case 
concerns Thomson’s work on cathode rays and his determination of the mass-to-charge 
ratio (m/e) of the electron. According to the official website of the Nobel Prize, it was 
because of this work that Thomson “received the Nobel Prize in 1906 for the discovery of 
the electron, the first elementary particle.”  Thomson (1897, 1967[1906]) hypothesized 3
that cathode rays are currents of “carriers of negative electricity” or “corpuscles”—what 
we now know as electrons.  His hypothesis was not only about the nature of cathode rays, 4
but also about the interaction among cathode rays and other theoretical entities such as 
electrostatic fields and electrons. In order to determine the mass-to-charge ratio, he 
measured the deflection of cathode rays passing through an electrostatic field, the 
strength of the electrostatic field, and other related magnitudes. He interpreted the value 
that he obtained for m/e in light of his hypothesis, and his experimental results confirmed 
that hypothesis. 
 However, one might ask how it’s possible to infer from Thomson’s experimental 
confirmation of his hypothesis to the claim that he had thereby demonstrated the 
existence of the electron. Philosophers can engage with such a question. And regardless 
of the answers they provide, they must at least defend those answers by invoking some 
kind of criterion for concluding that the evidence that scientists have offered does or does 
not constitute a demonstration of the existence of a given entity. To take one example of 
such a criterion, Hacking (1983, p. 23) suggests manipulation: “if you can spray them 
then they are real.” While Thomson manipulated cathode rays, he did not manipulate 
electrons, and so, according to Hacking’s criterion, Thomson did not offer evidence 
strong enough to demonstrate the existence of electrons. To take another example, there is 
what Psillos (2005, pp. 398-399) calls “the only workable criterion of reality,” which is 
“the explanatory criterion: something is real if its positing plays an indispensable role in 
the explanation of well-founded phenomena.” Suppose for the sake of argument that 
Thomson’s electron was explanatorily indispensable but not manipulable in the late 
nineteenth century. Consider two wholesalists, one of whom employs Hacking’s criterion 
 Retrieved January 27, 2016 from http://www.nobelprize.org/educational/physics/vacuum/3
experiment-1.html. See also Harré (2002[1981]) and Whittaker (1989).
 For the identification of Thomson’s corpuscles with electrons, see Rutherford (2004[1904], p. 53) and the 4
reprint of Thomson (1897) in Magie (1969, pp. 583-597), in which Magie makes the identification.
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as the sole criterion of reality, while the other employs Psillos’s criterion. These two 
wholesalists will come to conflicting conclusions, with one claiming that Thomson’s 
evidence doesn’t support the claim that the electron exists, and the other claiming that it 
does, respectively. Insofar as the disagreement between these two wholesalists concerns 
their chosen criterion of reality, their disagreement is, at least in part, a philosophical one. 
Similarly, a retailist who attempts to determine which of these two criteria is most 
appropriate in this case, or whether a third criterion is more appropriate, is engaging in a 
task that is distinctively philosophical. 
 At this stage of our argument, the important point is not whether Psillos or 
Hacking is correct. It is that providing a criterion for granting the reality of a theoretical 
entity, assessing the appropriateness of that criterion for the case at hand, and determining 
whether or not the evidence that scientists have offered satisfies that criterion, constitutes 
a way for philosophers to engage with retail arguments. Scientists are the ones who 
initially put forward retail arguments; they offer the first-order scientific evidence. Retail 
arguments, in Magnus and Callender’s sense, are what we call scientific retail arguments. 
We choose this label because retail arguments, for Magnus and Callender, do not go 
beyond the first-order scientific evidence, and because we want to contrast such 
arguments with what we call philosophical retail arguments. These arguments concern 
choosing an appropriate criterion of reality for a particular case and determining whether 
or not the first-order evidence presented in a scientific retail argument satisfies that 
criterion. In short, a philosophical retail argument results from the application of a 
criterion of reality to a scientific retail argument. Such arguments are philosophical 
because it is a distinctively philosophical task to identify a criterion of reality and 
determine whether or not it is satisfied in a given case.  
 One might be skeptical about our claim that such work is distinctively 
philosophical. Chang’s work on the relationship between the history of science and the 
philosophy of science provides an additional line of defense for our claim. Chang (2012a, 
p. 110) holds that “it is instructive to try seeing the history–philosophy relation as one 
between the concrete and the abstract . . . We cannot understand scientists’ actions, not to 
mention judge them, without considering them in abstract terms (such as ‘confirmed’, 
‘coherent’, ‘observation’, …” Determining whether or not some first-order scientific 
evidence satisfies a particular criterion of reality involves applying abstract concepts—
most notably, the criterion—to concrete cases. It also involves making judgments—most 
notably, about whether, in light of the criterion, the evidence does or does not suffice to 
establish the existence of a particular entity. If the work involved in advancing what we 
call a philosophical retail argument doesn’t count as philosophical, then neither does the 
kind of work in the history and philosophy of science that Chang has in mind. But if we 
conceive of philosophical work along the lines that Chang suggests, the notion of a 
philosophical retail argument gives us a way of avoiding the charge that retailism does 
not go beyond science into philosophy. It provides a way of developing retailism into a 
position that is distinctively philosophical. 
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3. Experimental Individuation as a Criterion of Reality  
Our goal in this section is to discuss how to understand experimental individuation and 
why it can serve as a criterion of reality for theoretical entities. We begin with the 
observation that individuation and ontological commitment are connected. When 
scientists are ontologically committed to the theoretical entities they posit, this 
commitment involves not just a belief that the entities exist, but also a responsibility to 
demonstrate their existence. Scientists may be able to individuate an entity theoretically. 
But individuating an entity in a theory is not sufficient to demonstrate that it exists. 
Demonstrating the existence of a posited entity often requires scientists to produce an 
individual instance or sample of that entity by performing an experiment, i.e., to 
experimentally individuate it. When scientists haven’t yet tried to experimentally 
individuate a posited entity, or when they repeatedly try and fail to do so, their 
ontological commitment to that entity is doubtful. 
 At this point, we should distinguish theoretical individuation from experimental 
individuation. Scientists theoretically individuate an entity if, in the course of theorizing, 
they describe a set of properties and behaviors of a posited entity by which they can 
identify it and distinguish it from other entities. However, these descriptions by which 
scientists theoretically individuate entities require evidence. Scientists can offer evidence 
for the existence of a theoretical entity if they produce an instance or sample of such an 
entity by performing an experiment. In doing so, they individuate an entity 
experimentally. 
 The relationship between theoretical individuation and experimental individuation 
is much the same as the relationship between theory and experiment more generally. 
Various worries about the theory-ladenness of experimentation are relevant here. If a 
theoretical hypothesis yields a prediction regarding some experimental result, the result 
may be interpreted in light of the hypothesis. Moreover, since a theoretical hypothesis 
may involve two or more theoretical entities and their interactions, it can be difficult to 
show that an experiment produces an instance or sample of the target entity, i.e., that it 
experimentally individuates that entity. And it can be difficult to judge whether an 
experiment produces a real individual, as opposed to a mere phenomenon that results 
from experimental apparatuses and their interactions with experimented objects. For 
these reasons, a conception of experimental individuation that is sufficiently independent 
of theoretical interpretation is needed.  
 Is there such a conception? One candidate is Hacking’s (1983, p. 23) manipulation 
criterion, which we mentioned in section 2. Perhaps experiments that individuate entities 
are experiments that manipulate them. However, since experimenters can manipulate not 
just real individuals, but also mere phenomena, manipulation is not sufficient for 
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experimental individuation.  Chen (2016) takes manipulation, along with two other 5
conditions, namely, separation and maintenance of structural unity, as necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions for the experimental individuation of a theoretical entity. In 
short, experiments that produce individuals are experiments that separate individuals 
from their surrounding environments, manipulate them, and maintain their structural 
unity throughout the process. Importantly, Chen’s further conditions ensure that the 
manipulated object is a real individual as opposed to a mere phenomenon. Since mere 
phenomena can’t be separated from the environments in which they become manifest, 
Chen’s separation condition avoids the problem of mistaking a mere phenomenon for a 
real entity. We return to this point in section 5, where we draw upon the case studies we 
discuss in section 4 in order to demonstrate more fully the extent to which this account of 
experimental individuation is sufficiently theory-independent. 
 Importantly, the criterion of experimental individuation has limited applicability 
because it can only be applied to cases in which scientists perform experiments on 
purported entities. Chen (2016) has discussed cases of experimental individuation from 
physics (the creation of Bose-Einstein condensates) and biology (genetic engineering). 
And later in this paper, we discuss two cases from chemistry (the discovery of potassium 
in section 4.1 and the elimination of the muriatic radical in section 4.2) and another case 
from physics (Thomson’s work on cathode rays in section 4.3). Physics, chemistry, and 
biology provide the most favorable cases for our criterion. But it’s not clear that our 
criterion is applicable to all of the experimental sciences, since it’s not clear what 
experimental individuation would amount to in, say, experimental economics or 
psychology. And it is inapplicable to branches of science that do not make use of 
experiments, for example, astronomy for much of its history. Our criterion is only 
applicable to cases that involve the performance of experiments on purported entities.  
 Our criterion may seem to have limited applicability in another sense, namely, 
that it is only applicable to entities that are individuals. Some theoretical entities, like the 
chemical substances named by mass terms like ‘water,’ ‘phlogiston,’ and ‘oxygen,’ are 
paradigm cases of non-individuals. It’s therefore not immediately obvious how we can 
appeal to the notion of experimental individuation when it comes to such entities. 
However, this sort of limited applicability is only apparent. We propose to apply our 
criterion to chemical substances by considering the experimental individuation of 
samples of such substances, as we illustrate in section 4.1 in terms of the discovery of 
potassium. Since samples count as individuals, our criterion is applicable to cases 
involving non-individuals like chemical substances. 
 That said, the applicability of our criterion is still limited, in which case it’s 
reasonable to admit other criteria of reality in addition to the criterion of experimental 
 Bueno (2018) argues for a similar point from an empiricist perspective. He uses three cases of trapping 5
quantum particles in experiments in order to argue that Hacking’s manipulation criterion cannot 
successfully serve as a criterion of reality. 
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individuation. Other criteria of reality include observation, exploration, and 
measurement. While we may not be able to experimentally individuate celestial bodies, 
astronomers’ observations of those bodies constitute a good reason to be a realist about 
them. Seismologists’ explorations of the earth’s core by means of seismic waves 
constitute a good reason to be a realist about it, though there’s no way to experimentally 
individuate it. And although physicists working in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries were not able to experimentally individuate atoms, the fact that they were able 
to measure the value of Avogadro’s number in distinct ways constitutes a good reason to 
be a realist about atoms. 
 More generally, experimental individuation is sometimes not possible, either due 
to (1) technological limitations or to (2) the fact that the (purported) entity in question is 
not the sort of thing that can be individuated experimentally. Upon examining the details 
of a particular case, one may come to the conclusion that adopting a realist attitude 
towards a particular posited entity prima facie requires the experimental individuation of 
that posited entity or of a sample of that posited entity. In such cases, if neither (1) nor (2) 
is the case, experimental individuation is an appropriate criterion of reality to apply, and 
it is not merely a sufficient condition for reality but also a necessary one. In such cases, 
failure to experimentally individuate a posited entity or sample of a posited entity 
constitutes a good reason to be an anti-realist about that entity. However, when (1) is the 
case, we can admit other criteria of reality while maintaining that experimental 
individuation would still constitute strong evidence for the reality of the entity. And when 
(2) is the case, we can admit that the criterion of experimental individuation is 
inapplicable and rely on other criteria. Hence, experimental individuation as a criterion of 
reality is not applicable to theoretical entities in general. As a result, a wholesale 
argument based on this criterion is untenable, and our view that experimental 
individuation is one of several criteria of reality fits naturally into the retailist framework 
that we introduced in section 2. 
4. Three Historical Case Studies 
In this section, we use three cases from the history of science to discuss how 
experimental individuation is used as a criterion of reality. In cases in which an instance 
or sample of a posited entity is required for demonstrating its existence, we find that 
scientists often try to settle the ontological status of the entity by attempting to 
experimentally produce such an instance or sample. However, they do so without 
explicitly invoking or relying on experimental individuation as a criterion of reality—
their goal is merely to offer an instance or sample. In cases in which scientists succeed in 
offering an instance or sample, they tend to conclude that the entity exists. Repeated 
failure leads scientists to either conclude that it doesn’t exist, or else search for other 
ways to demonstrate its existence.  
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 It’s worth first clarifying the role that these case studies play. If we were to claim 
that our criterion of experimental individuation can simply be read off of these case 
studies, then it’s not clear that articulating and defending a criterion of reality would take 
us beyond science into philosophy. In order to defend against this objection, we begin by 
emphasizing that, in some cases, experimental individuation is merely implicit in 
scientific practice. When Chen initially proposed his conception of experimental 
individuation, he presented it as a conception that is “implied by the use of certain 
experimental techniques” and “drawn from the performance of related 
experiments” (2016, pp. 354, 355). In other words, this conception is not something that 
scientists have articulated explicitly, and it takes some philosophical work to show how 
experimental individuation is implicit in experimental practices and applicable as a 
criterion of reality. In other cases, experimental individuation is not implicit in scientific 
practice, for example, when scientists have no intention to isolate an instance or sample 
of a posited entity or have not succeeded in doing so. In some such cases, experimental 
individuation is nonetheless an appropriate criterion of reality to apply because an 
instance or sample of a posited entity is prima facie required in order to demonstrate its 
existence. And importantly, it takes some philosophical work to show this. 
 One more clarification is in order. In some of the case studies that follow, our 
judgment regarding the existence of a particular kind of entity matches the judgment of 
the scientists we discuss. One might object that we therefore aren’t really going beyond 
science into philosophy. In order to respond to this objection, we begin by noting that 
scientists’ reasoning tends to operate at the level of the first-order evidence and to 
concern how that evidence supports or tells against various claims and hypotheses—this 
is a scientific retail argument. Scientists tend not to conduct their reasoning in terms of 
whether or not this first-order evidence satisfies a criterion of reality like experimental 
individuation. Our goal in examining these case studies is to make explicit the criterion of 
reality (namely, experimental individuation) that is prima facie appropriate for the entities 
in question, determine whether the first-order evidence satisfies that criterion, and 
thereby advance philosophical retail arguments. In cases where we come to the same 
conclusions as the scientists involved, it should be emphasized that we do so via a 
different route. Scientists reach their conclusions via the first-order evidence, whereas we 
reach our conclusions by considering whether or not this evidence satisfies the criterion 
of experimental individuation.  
4.1 A Realist Conclusion Regarding Davy’s Potassium 
To begin with, we will discuss Davy’s discovery of the element potassium. Davy first 
isolated potassium by decomposing potash, which he did by means of electrolysis (1808, 
pp. 4-5). He was the first to decompose potash, though for some time, chemists suspected 
it to be a compound, and so it was an outstanding problem to discover the constituent 
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elements of potash—the posited entities in this case.  Davy acted on a small piece of 6
moistened potash with a Voltaic battery. As a result, at the negative surface of the battery 
Davy observed the appearance of “small globules having a high metallic lustre, and being 
precisely similar in visible characters to quicksilver” (1808, p. 5). In the lecture in which 
he reports these results, Davy goes on to write: “These globules, numerous experiments 
soon shewed to be the substance I was in search of, and a peculiar inflammable principle 
the basis of potash” (1808, p. 5). And later in the lecture, he proposes the name “Potasium 
[sic]” for the basis of potash (1808, p. 32). 
 This experiment, on its own, did not demonstrate the experimental individuation 
of a sample of potassium. However, this experiment, combined with other experiments 
that Davy conducted, collectively satisfy Chen’s three conditions for experimental 
individuation. 
 First of all, there is Chen’s separation condition: scientists must separate the 
entities that they produce “from their environments” (2016, p. 348), and “from the 
experimental instruments that may have helped produce [them]” (2016, p. 365). In order 
to determine whether his results depended on the platinum instruments that he used, Davy 
performed a number of experiments using a variety of other materials, including copper, 
silver, and gold (1808, p. 5). And in order to determine whether his results depended on 
the fact that he conducted his experiments in the open atmosphere, he performed similar 
experiments in a vacuum (1808, p. 5). In all of these cases, he obtained the same results. 
These experiments collectively show that Davy had separated potassium from its 
surrounding environment (including the atmosphere and the other components of potash), 
and from the instruments that he used, thereby satisfying Chen’s separation condition. 
 Second, there is Chen’s condition regarding the maintenance of structural unity. 
Chen understands structural unity as the idea that “the components of an individual are 
structured into a whole in some specific manner” (2016, p. 358). Davy encountered a 
number of difficulties when it came to maintaining the structural unity of the globules of 
potassium that he had produced because “they acted more or less upon almost every body 
to which they were exposed” (1808, p. 10). One of the first things Davy notes about the 
globules is that they did not last long—the ones that did not explode immediately after 
forming soon lost their metallic luster and became “covered by a white film” (1808, p. 5). 
Davy identifies this film as pure potash, and explains how it attracts moisture from the 
atmosphere, converting the globule into a saturated solution of potash (1808, p. 7). 
Eventually, Davy discovered one substance on which potassium did not have much of an 
effect, namely, recently distilled naphtha (1808, p. 10). He used that fluid to preserve 
globules of potassium, and he was able to examine the properties of potassium in the 
atmosphere by covering the globules with a thin film of naphtha. This method allowed 
Davy to maintain the structural unity of potassium, thus satisfying Chen’s condition. 
 See Lavoisier (1965[1789], p. 156).6
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 Third, there is Chen’s manipulation condition. Chen understands this condition in 
terms of the “instrumental use” of an object “to investigate other phenomena of 
nature” (2016, p. 358). Towards the end of the lecture in which he reports the electrolytic 
decomposition of potash, Davy conjectures that the globules of potassium he isolated 
“will undoubtedly prove powerful agents for analysis; and having an affinity for oxygene 
[sic] stronger than any other known substances, they may possibly supersede the 
application of electricity to some of the undecompounded bodies” (1808, p. 44). Making 
good on this conjecture would amount to showing that chemists can use potassium to 
decompose previously undecomposed substances, thereby satisfying Chen’s manipulation 
condition. And in the following year, Davy (1809, pp. 76-77) and also Gay-Lussac and 
Thénard (1808), made good on this conjecture by using potassium to extract the oxygen 
from a previously undecomposed substance, namely, boracic acid, thereby decomposing 
it. 
 Our approach yields the following picture of this case. Davy gives us a scientific 
retail argument, in which he presents some first-order scientific evidence for the existence 
of potassium. As we have seen, Davy separates samples of potassium from their 
surrounding environment, manipulates them, and maintains their structural unity; he 
thereby experimentally individuates samples of potassium. And while Davy does all these 
things, he does not attempt to support his claims by appealing to the satisfaction of 
criteria like manipulation or experimental individuation. To put the point another way, he 
shows how to experimentally produce samples of potassium and demonstrate their 
properties without claiming that, because we can individuate such samples, we are 
justified in adding potassium to the list of chemical substances. His reasoning thus 
remains at the level of the first-order evidence. In contrast, we have just presented a 
philosophical retail argument which shows that Davy’s argument satisfies Chen’s three 
conditions, and thereby satisfies our criterion of experimental individuation. In that case, 
we draw the conclusion that we ought to be realists about potassium. 
4.2 An Anti-realist Conclusion Regarding Lavoisier’s Muriatic Radical 
For our second case, we will discuss the elimination of the muriatic radical, a 
hypothetical component of hydrochloric acid.  Scheele was the first to decompose this 7
acid, which he called “acid of salt,” and he identified its constituent substances as 
phlogiston and “dephlogisticated acid of salt” (1931[1774]). However, it was a matter of 
some controversy whether he had succeeded in decomposing hydrochloric acid. 
According to Lavoisier’s oxygen theory of acidity, all acids are composed of oxygen (the 
principle of acidity, i.e., that which gives acids their acidic properties) and a radical, 
which can be either a simple substance or a compound (1965[1789], pp. 65, 115). Neither 
Scheele nor any other chemist had been able to extract the oxygen from hydrochloric 
 See Hricko (2018) for a detailed discussion of this case.7
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acid, which Lavoisier called “muriatic acid.” And so Lavoisier held that it remained 
undecomposed; and, in accordance with his theory, he hypothesized that it must contain 
oxygen combined with what he called “the muriatic radical” (1965[1789], pp. 71-72). As 
for Scheele’s dephlogisticated acid of salt, Lavoisier held that it is a compound of 
muriatic acid and oxygen, which he called “oxygenated muriatic acid” (1965[1789], p. 
73), which we now know as chlorine. Lavoisier thereby theoretically individuated the 
muriatic radical as that substance which combines with oxygen to form muriatic acid, 
which, in turn, is converted into oxygenated muriatic acid (i.e., chlorine) by means of 
combining with even more oxygen. 
 But theoretical individuation is a mere belief, and as such, it was not enough to 
settle the ontological status of the muriatic radical for the chemistry community at the 
time. Chemists reasoned that, if the radical were to exist, they should be able to isolate it. 
And so, for some time, chemists attempted to decompose muriatic acid, and thereby 
isolate the radical. When we consider things in terms of the satisfaction of criteria of 
reality, their attempts to do so made sense since experimentally individuating the radical 
requires isolating a sample of it. Moreover, experimentally individuating the radical 
would have settled its ontological status, just as Davy’s experimental individuation of 
potassium settled its ontological status.  
 The case of the muriatic radical culminates with an argument, due to Davy (1810, 
pp. 235-236), that casts serious doubt over the existence of the radical. Davy emphasizes 
the results of various experiments that he and other chemists performed, which show that 
what Davy called oxymuriatic acid (i.e., oxygenated muriatic acid or chlorine) combines 
with hydrogen to form muriatic acid. And he goes on to discuss those experiments that 
seem to show the decomposition of oxymuriatic acid into oxygen and muriatic acid. Davy 
observes that in these experiments, water is always present. And he concludes that the 
oxygen that such experiments produce results from the decomposition of the water, not 
from the decomposition of oxymuriatic acid, which has not been demonstrated. Davy 
later went on to argue for the elementary nature of this latter substance, and proposed a 
new name for it: “Chlorine” (1811, p. 32). To be sure, Davy (1811, p. 35) does state that 
“[t]here may be oxygene [sic] in oxymuriatic gas; but I can find none” (1811, p. 35, 
Davy’s emphasis). And in a letter to Berzelius, Davy writes: “I think it probable that 
[chlorine] contain[s] oxygene [sic] … but it is absolutely necessary to distinguish 
between what is very probable and what is known” (1813, Davy’s emphasis). If 
oxymuriatic acid doesn’t contain oxygen, and muriatic acid contains oxymuriatic acid 
and hydrogen, then muriatic acid doesn’t contain oxygen either. To adopt Davy’s later 
terminology, the only components of muriatic acid are hydrogen and chlorine. Based on 
this view of the components of muriatic acid, Davy argued that Lavoisier was in error 
while Scheele was basically correct (1810, pp. 236-237). This perhaps surprising 
endorsement of Scheele results from Davy’s identification of Scheele’s dephlogisticated 
acid of salt with oxymuriatic acid, i.e., chlorine; and from the fact that Davy, like a 
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number of latter-day phlogiston theorists, identified hydrogen with phlogiston.  The 8
claim that muriatic (hydrochloric) acid is made up of hydrogen and dephlogisticated acid 
of salt, even if terminologically problematic, is essentially correct. Lavoisier, however, 
was in error since hydrochloric acid contains no oxygen, thus falsifying his oxygen 
theory of acidity. At any rate, Davy’s arguments eventually convinced the chemistry 
community to eliminate the muriatic radical from chemistry. 
 Although Davy’s argument is a scientific retail argument, when we consider this 
case in terms of criteria of reality, we come to the same conclusion regarding the non-
existence of the muriatic radical. Once again, the most appropriate criterion is 
experimental individuation. As we discussed in section 3, in some cases, experimental 
individuation is not an appropriate criterion, either because of technological limitations, 
or because the purported entity is not the sort of thing that one could experimentally 
individuate. In this case, neither of these considerations apply. Failures to experimentally 
individuate the muriatic radical could not be explained away in terms of technological 
limitations since Davy presented an alternative explanation for these failures, namely, 
that muriatic acid and oxymuriatic acid do not contain oxygen. Moreover, the muriatic 
radical was conceived of as a chemical substance. Samples of chemical substances are 
required to demonstrate their existence, and are precisely the kinds of thing that can be 
experimentally individuated. In this case, then, experimental individuation is not merely a 
sufficient condition for concluding that the muriatic radical exists, but also a necessary 
one. And so, we have a philosophical retail argument for an anti-realist attitude towards 
the muriatic radical. 
 We draw the following three morals from this case. First of all, if scientists can 
experimentally individuate an entity, that is a sufficient reason to be a realist about that 
entity. Second, when experimental individuation is a necessary condition for reality, 
failure to experimentally individuate a theoretical entity is a sufficient reason to conclude 
that the entity does not exist. Third, theoretical individuation is not sufficient to establish 
the existence of a theoretical entity since, as this case illustrates, theoretical individuation 
is sometimes possible even if experimental individuation is not. In sum, according to the 
criterion of experimental individuation, one has sufficient reason to draw an anti-realist 
conclusion regarding Lavoisier’s muriatic radical. 
 Before moving on, it’s worth noting that NMA-inspired wholesale realism may 
encounter some trouble in accommodating this case. For many wholesale realists, the sole 
criterion of reality for theoretical entities concerns whether those entities were posited in 
the context of a successful theory—if they were, then we should conclude that they are 
real. Lavoisierian chemistry is often taken to be a paradigm case of successful science 
while phlogistic chemistry is often excluded as such. For example, Hardin and Rosenberg 
(1982, pp. 609-610) claim that Lavoisierian chemistry is a mature science, while 
 See Kirwan (1789, pp. 4-5).8
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phlogistic chemistry is not, and Psillos (1999, p. 291) argues that ‘phlogiston’ was a non-
referring term. In that case, it follows that the oxygen theory of acidity is at least 
approximately true, and that the entities that it posits, including the muriatic radical, 
exist.  On the other hand, if ‘phlogiston’ is a non-referring term, then the phlogiston 9
theory is either false or lacks a truth-value, and so dephlogisticated acid of salt does not 
exist.  However, some philosophers (Ladyman 2011, pp. 98-99; Lyons 2002, p. 70) have 10
argued that phlogistic chemistry was a successful science. In that case, wholesale realists 
would have to conclude that both the muriatic radical and dephlogisticated acid of salt 
exist. The problem is that both conclusions are implausible. It seems much better to 
conclude that Lavoisier’s muriatic radical doesn’t exist, while Scheele’s dephlogisticated 
acid of salt does. When it comes to this case, retailism does a better job than wholesalism 
since our retailist position secures an anti-realist result regarding the muriatic radical. If 
there are good reasons to conclude that Scheele experimentally individuated a sample of 
dephlogisticated acid of salt, then our position can also secure a realist result regarding 
that substance. However, this is a contentious conclusion for which we cannot offer an 
argument here.  11
4.3 An Indefinite Conclusion Regarding Thomson’s Electrified Particles 
Thomson’s work on cathode rays is our third case. Cathode rays are a kind of luminous 
phenomenon within a discharging tube. They are produced by the discharging from the 
cathode when the barometric pressure within the tube is extremely low. Scientists in the 
nineteenth century wondered what cathode rays are. By 1883, two rival hypotheses about 
the nature of cathode rays were proposed. One claimed that cathode rays are ethereal 
waves; and the other that they are electrified particles. Hertz supported the former 
hypothesis and designed an experiment to confirm it, while some English scientists, 
including Thomson, supported the latter hypothesis. Against this background, Thomson 
performed his own experiments.  12
 Thomson (1897) designed a new type of cathode ray tube (Fig. 1) to perform a 
deflection experiment. Thomson’s thought was that a cathode would produce both 
electric currents and cathode rays when discharging, and that, in order to determine the 
 One might suspect that Lavoisier’s error regarding muriatic acid was disconnected from the main posits of 9
his oxygen theory. However, Chang (2012b, p. 8) identifies Lavoisier’s theory of acidity as one of “[t]hree 
major pillars of Lavoisier’s system of chemistry,” and points out that Lavoisier chose the term 
‘oxygen’ (which literally means ‘acid-generator’ in Greek) because of its central role in his system as the 
acidifying principle (2012b, p. 9).
 It’s worth noting that neither Hardin and Rosenberg nor Psillos discuss dephlogisticated acid of salt. That 10
said, it follows from Psillos’s claims regarding the reference of ‘phlogiston’ that dephlogisticated acid of 
salt is a non-existent entity.
 See Hricko (2018, pp. 273-275) for a retail argument for this conclusion regarding Scheele’s 11
dephlogisticated acid of salt.
 For a detailed history, see Buchwald (1995a, 1995b).12
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composition of cathode rays, it would be necessary to eliminate the electric currents and 
experiment with purified cathode rays. Purification is the function of the cylindrical metal 
ring B, which absorbs the electric currents leaked from A and thus ensures that the ray 
passing through B is pure. Thomson found that the purified cathode ray was deflected 
when it passed between the plates D and E, thus confirming that cathode rays are made 
up of negatively electrified bodies. 
  
Fig. 1 Thomson’s cathode ray tube in 1897, reproduced from Thomson (1897, p. 296) 
 While Thomson’s experiment satisfies Chen’s conditions when it comes to 
cathode rays, he didn’t thereby experimentally individuate the electrons that make them 
up. Thomson succeeded in separating cathode rays from currents; purifying them with 
the metal ring B, and thus maintaining their structural unity; and manipulating them by 
deflecting them with an electrostatic field. According to Chen’s conditions, one can say 
that Thomson experimentally individuated cathode rays and demonstrated that they are 
currents of negative electricity. But Thomson hypothesized that the currents consist of 
electrified particles that are separable individuals. Therefore, the experimental 
individuation of these electrified particles is a reasonable and applicable criterion for 
granting their reality. Because Thomson hypothesized that the particles are separable 
individuals but did not experimentally individuate them, he did not demonstrate their 
existence but only indicated the possibility that they exist. After all, in the late nineteenth 
century, it was possible to conclude that the difficulty in isolating a single particle was 
due either to technological limitations, or to the possibility that cathode rays are not the 
kind of entity that consists of separable particles. In this case, experimental individuation 
is merely a sufficient but unnecessary condition for granting the reality of Thomson’s 
particles. Hence, the proper response to the scientific retail argument that Thomson gives 
us is neither realism nor anti-realism, but rather an indefinite conclusion regarding the 
existence of electrons as particles, at least until there is a conclusive philosophical retail 
argument.  
 One may argue that, by determining the value of m/e, Thomson’s argument 
satisfies some kind of measurement criterion of reality, and so his argument provides a 
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reason to take a realist attitude towards electrified particles. However, one should note 
that Thomson’s measurement of m/e is theory-dependent, because the equation he uses to 
compute the value of m/e presupposes that cathode rays consist of particles. Through the 
equation I = Hρ = mv/e, Thomson derived the following equation: 
 m/e = I2Q/2W  
Q represents the quantity of electricity carried by those particles, where Q = Ne (N is the 
number of particles passing across any section of the beam at a given time and e is the 
charge of a single particle); W is the kinetic energy of the particles and v is the velocity of 
the particles such that W = 1/2(Nmv2); and I = Hρ in which ρ is the radius of curvature of 
the path of these rays in the magnetic field H (Thomson 1897, pp. 302-303). In the 
derivation of m/e, Thomson presupposed that cathode rays are composed of electrified 
particles by supposing Q = Ne. Before his experiment, no other experiments had been 
performed to demonstrate this presupposition. This makes his experiment and 
measurement theory-dependent. Based on another hypothesis, one may reasonably 
interpret m/e as the charge carried by a mass unit of cathode rays which consists of a kind 
of non-discrete matter rather than separable particles. We can make this interpretation 
clearer by using an analogy: When one measures the mass-to-volume ratio of water, one 
does not demonstrate that water consists of separable particles. Similarly, by measuring 
the mass-to-charge ratio of cathode rays, Thomson did not demonstrate that cathode rays 
consist of separable particles. As a consequence, Thomson could offer only theory-
dependent evidence for realism about electrified particles, evidence that does not 
conclusively settle the issue.  After all, if Thomson were to claim that cathode rays 13
consist of non-discrete matter, then his experiment would demonstrate the existence of 
cathode rays as electrified matter.  
 In this case, the criterion of experimental individuation is applicable and it leads 
to an indefinite conclusion regarding Thomson’s electrified particles. To be sure, 
experimental individuation of electrified particles is not implicit in Thomson’s practice 
since he did not individuate them. However, if we operate under the belief that electrified 
particles are individuals, isolating an individual or sample in order to demonstrate the 
existence of such particles is a reasonable requirement. After all, scientists working in the 
late nineteenth century did not know whether individuating electrified particles was 
possible with advances in technology and experimental design, or impossible due to the 
true (perhaps non-discrete) nature of cathode rays. It is therefore reasonable to expect 
such scientists to design and perform experiments that aim to isolate an electrified 
particle. Therefore, according to the criterion of experimental individuation, the existence 
of electrified particles was not conclusively demonstrated by Thomson’s work. 
 Hacking (1983, pp. 22-23) draws a stronger conclusion when he claims that he would not have been a 13
realist about electrons even in 1908, when Millikan measured the charge of the electron.
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 Today, we know that, according to quantum mechanics, isolating an electron is 
theoretically impossible. Hence, experimental individuation may no longer be an 
appropriate criterion for this case even though it was an appropriate criterion in 1897. 
And so we have an example in which experimental individuation as a criterion of reality 
is inapplicable to a particular case. 
5. Theory, Experiment, and Individuation 
The concerns about the theory-dependence of criteria that we discussed in relation to 
Thomson’s work lead us to defend experimental individuation as a criterion of reality in 
another way. We will argue that it is a relatively theory-independent criterion of reality.  
 Chen (2016, pp. 354-355) argues that his characterization of experimental 
individuation is theory-independent in the following way. He follows Radder (1995) and 
Chen (2007) in distinguishing three parts of an experiment: its design, its performance, 
and the interpretation of its results. Chen admits that the design of an experiment and the 
interpretation of its results may depend on theory. But the performance of an experiment, 
along with the results that it yields, are at least causally independent of theory, since they 
result from the actions of experimenters. Insofar as Chen’s three conditions are implicit in 
the performance of experiments, their satisfaction is causally independent of theory as 
well. To put it another way, whether an experiment has succeeded in separating an entity 
from its environment, manipulating it, and maintaining its structural unity is a theory-
independent matter. That said, in order to interpret whether an experiment satisfies these 
conditions, one may end up making use of theory. 
 We acknowledge that theory and experiment can often be intertwined in various 
ways. That said, if experimental individuation is to serve as a criterion for the reality of 
theoretical entities, it’s beneficial for it to be characterized in a relatively theory-
independent way. We now discuss two ways in which our criterion is better than more 
theory-dependent criteria. 
 First of all, our criterion provides a reason to take a realist attitude towards 
entities posited in theories that are not among our best theories. For example, one may 
want to take a realist attitude towards Scheele’s dephlogisticated acid of salt even if one 
is unwilling to count Scheele’s phlogiston theory among our best theories. In that case, a 
theoretical justification of this realist attitude won’t work. However, if Scheele 
experimentally individuated dephlogisticated acid of salt, then our criterion provides a 
reason to be a realist about dephlogisticated acid of salt. More generally, there are cases 
in which unsuccessful theories are associated with successful experimental practices, and 
in such cases, attempts to justify realism by appealing to the explanatory successes of 
theories simply won’t work. If we want to justify a realist attitude towards an entity in 
such a case, we must appeal to the success of experimental practices, and our criterion of 
experimental individuation presents a way of doing so. 
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 Second, our criterion meets Stanford’s (2006, pp. 166-169) prospective 
applicability condition. According to this condition, criteria of reality should not just be 
applicable in retrospect. Instead, it should have been possible to apply such criteria in the 
past to then-current science, without knowing about future scientific developments; and it 
should be possible to apply those criteria to present-day science as well. The primary 
motivation for this condition is that it is question-begging to use our present theories to 
identify the components of past theories that we ought to be realists about, since the truth 
of our present theories is one of the central issues about which realists and anti-realists 
disagree. Our criterion satisfies this condition, and one of the reasons why it does so is 
that it is relatively theory-independent. In order to apply our criterion, we must determine 
whether particular experimental practices succeeded in experimentally individuating a 
particular entity. And there is no need to make use of present-day theory in order to 
determine whether past experimental practices were successful in this regard, as we 
illustrated with the case of Davy’s discovery of potassium. It is sufficient to examine the 
experiments themselves in order to apply our criterion. 
6. Conclusion 
We have argued that experimental individuation can be used as a relatively theory-
independent criterion of reality. We have embedded this claim regarding experimental 
individuation within a retailist framework that allows for other criteria of reality. And we 
have illustrated this retailist approach by developing three philosophical retail arguments 
based on three case studies from the history of science: an argument for realism about 
potassium, an argument for anti-realism about the muriatic radical, and an argument for 
an indefinite conclusion regarding Thomson’s electrified particles. These arguments are 
philosophical because assessing whether a particular criterion is appropriate for a case 
and showing that such a criterion is or is not satisfied in a given case involves going 
beyond scientists’ own presentation of the first-order evidence. And they are retail 
arguments because they concern the reality of particular kinds of theoretical entities, and 
because the criterion of reality that we appeal to cannot be generalized to all, or even 
most, theoretical entities.  
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